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C H A P T E R  1 1  
F I D U C I A R Y  P R I N C I P L E S  
I N  B A N K R U P T C Y  
A N D  I N S O L V E N C Y  
JOHN A. E.  POTTOW 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ALT HO UGH mentioned nowhere in the U.S .  Bankruptcy Code, "fiduciary duties" play a 
central role in guiding the administration of an insolvent debtor's assets. The chief actor 
doing that administration is the bankruptcy trustee, who is subject to a host of duties, 
some of which are unquestionably fiduciary. One of the greatest challenges a bankruptcy 
trustee faces in the discharge of these duties, however, is the widely divergent interests of 
the heterogeneous creditor constituency. Regarding that difficulty, fiduciary law offers 
varying degrees of help to bankruptcy trustees in their unenviable task. Even when fidu­
ciary law rears its head with respect to these conflicts, disagreement is rife in the case law 
regarding its mandate, with courts often repairing to broad platitudes.1 Yet the system 
still seems to work tolerably, in spite of all this chaos, with a pragmatic quasi-implicit 
recognition that conflicted interests are just endemic to bankruptcy. 
This chapter will canvass the bankruptcy trustees duties, which are triggered by virtue 
of appointment in a case. It focuses on the fiduciary duties of care and especially loyalty, 
given these inescapable conflicts, proceeding as follows. First, it offers a bankruptcy law 
primer on the role of the trustee and debtor-in-possession to enable more critical under­
standing of the fiduciary duty discussion to follow. Second, it discusses the trustees 
various duties, focusing first on the degree to which they can be characterized as fiduci­
ary, and then on the specific content of the duties of care and loyalty. The exquisite loyalty 
challenges the trustee faces are explored in some depth, broken into a taxonomy of 
1 See, e.g., In re AFI Holding, Inc., 530 E3d 832,844 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[Tjrustee 'may not be the repre­
sentative of any particular creditor, but must represent all. 
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"external" duties to the debtors estate broadly and "internal" duties to the differing classes 
of creditors therein (with the conflicts of these differing classes illustrated in even greater 
detail). The analysis shows that the help fiduciary law can provide is varying. Next this 
chapter explains the byzantine protective remedies doctrines trustees face from litiga­
tion that implicitly recognize the difficulty of their task given these conflicts. Finally it 
comments upon miscellaneous additional duties of the trustee and reflects upon the 
unique challenges the debtor-in-possession faces with its duty of lovalty, suggesting the 
bankruptcy system has pragmatic structural safeguards that not onlv mitigate some of 
these tensions but may even provide a model forconllict -laden fiduciaries elsewhere 
II .  BANKRUPTCY PRIMER 
To understand the various doctrines and rules affecting fiduciary responsibilities in 
bankruptcy, a quick bankruptcy terrain overview is required. One overarching consid­
eration at the outset is that bankruptcy law is designed as a collective resolution 
mechanism, it corrals multiple claimants on a debtor's property into one compulson' 
proceeding, and so much of its design is about centralizing control over unrulv creditors 
(and debtors).2 
The filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers several legal consequences in so central-
g mu tiple disputes. First, it imposes an automatic stay on any legal and extralegal 
th rl K actiyities. Second, it creates an estate" of all the debtor's property, divesting 
oro control over the res, albeit with title remaining in the debtor's name.4 Third, 
nft-h ntro'estate t0 ^e trustee,' who has authority under various provisions 
attenti • "PtCy ^0Ck t0 oversee 'hese assets.5 The trustee will be the focus of our 
attention in this analysis of fiduciary duties. 
The mnsr 1 U'5tC^°de a'so contains various chapters for specific tvpes of proceedings. 
Cha ter ^!, Ude chaPters 7. u> and 13. 
torv the acwtc 6 .P1™01^'3' disposition of debtor assets: the trustee's job is to inven-
to the debtor and"^ C a'mS fi'ed against the estate, carve out exempt assets for return 
nonexempt property^ Ttf pV'dends t0 unsecured creditors based on the liquidation of 
erally be grouped' f C ° 6 SPec'desah'erarchy of creditor claims, which can gen-
subordinated 7 °Uf C'asses: secured, priority unsecured, general unsecured, and 
proposes voluntary /fn'Zation Proceeding, chiefly for businesses, in which the debtor 
subjected to sunerm • COncess'ons t0 creditors, who are separated into classes and 
aJontarian voting rules for approving (or vetoing) a p'an 
2 Jgg 
6 ^ee 11 U.S.C. § 362. . ,?le ^°8'c and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (1986). 
See id. 701 et s ; See id. §§ 702,704,1104,1106,1302. 
4 ld-^5o6,So7,51o. 
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reorganization.8 (One requirement of Chapter 11 is a minimum dividend not falling 
below what would be achieved in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.9) 
Chapter 13 is a special reorganization for individual debtors, where they may propose 
their own repayment plan spanning three to five years, paying over net income to their 
creditors but retaining all their property—including nonexempt property that otherwise 
would be liquidated in a Chapter 7—in exchange for debt discharge at plan completion.10 
Although the trustee is primarily regulated in Chapter 7, separate provisions of the Code 
prescribe special rules for trustees in Chapters 11 and 13.11 
The identity of the trustee depends upon under which chapter the debtor files. In 
Chapter 7 proceedings, the trustee at the start of the case is technically the "interim" 
trustee, who is selected usually randomly from a panel mostly composed of bank­
ruptcy lawyers established by the U.S. Trustees Office.12 (The U.S. Trustee is a federal 
Department of Justice official, like a U.S. Attorney, who oversees bankruptcy cases 
proceeding in his or her district and reports to the D.C.-based "Executive Office of the 
United States Trustee" (EOUST)).13 Although nominally creditors can vote for a trustee, 
the interim trustee functionally becomes the trustee upon creditor nonvote.14 
In Chapter 13, because the debtor will be languishing in bankruptcy for three to five 
years, control of property stays with the debtor, who revests in the estate property upon 
plan confirmation.15 There is also an officer, also appointed by the U.S. Trustee, called 
the "Standing Trustee" for the district.16 As a logistical matter, the debtor's monthly 
payments are funneled through the Standing Trustees Office, although some secured 
creditors (e.g., mortgagees) are often paid directly, "outside" the plan.17 
In Chapter 11, U.S. law demonstrates its remarkable vision, subject to increasing 
global replication: the "debtor-in-possession" (DIP) concept.18 Under the DIP model, no 
trustee is appointed; the debtor remains in control of its property and its estate, vesting 
in most—but importantly, not all—of the trustees responsibilities.19 There is some debate 
in bankruptcy literature whether the DIP is a separate entity from the debtor or just the 
debtor with additional responsibilities and powers, but the point remains that the DIP 
runs the show.20 Under certain circumstances, the DIP can be displaced and an external 
trustee appointed (generally known as a debtor "out of possession"), but those cases are 
rare.21 The U.S. experience serves as marked contrast to many other systems of insol­
vency, such as U.K. "administration," in which the first thing that happens upon filing is 
8 Id. §§ 1124,1129. ' Id. § 1129(a)(7). 10 Id. §§ 1325,1328. 
" See id. §§ 704,1106,1302. 12 Id. §§ 322(b)(1), 701. 
13 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 581,586; 28 C.F.R. §§ 58.1 et seq. 14 11 U.S.C. §§ 701,702. 
15 Id. § 1327(b). 16 28 U.S.C. § 586(b); 11 U.S.C. § 1302. 
17 See, e.g., In re Clay, 339 B.R. 784,789 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) (describing process). 
18 11 U.S.C. § 1107. 19 Id. § 1106. 
20 See Thomas G. Kelch, The Phantom Fiduciary: The Debtor in Possession in Chapter 11,38 Wayne L. 
Rev. 1323,1331 (1992) (chronicling growing "resistance" to new entity theory). 
11 U.S.C. § 1104 (focusing specifically on beneficiaries of the estate, not broader considerations of 
public interest). 
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divestiture of authority of debtors management and appointment of the British analogue 
to a trustee.22 
One final point in this bankruptcy law primer: the trustee (and DIP in Chapteru) 
enjoys special powers under federal bankruptcy law usually referred to as "avoiding 
powers." Generally, federal bankruptcy law takes state law property and contract rights 
as it finds them, although subject to an important caveat of countervailing federal bank­
ruptcy purposes.23 That said, the Code confers various instances of redistributivepower 
that allow trustees to claw back some transactions, l or example, an unsecured creditor 
who receives an eve-of-bankruptcy (usually ninety days) transfer of debtor propertv 
that allows a better payout than would otherwise be achieved through pro rata distribu­
tion has receiveda "voidable preference," which the trustee can choose to rescind for the 
benefit of the estate. Thus, DIPs in Chapter 11 can suddenlv find themselves armed 
with powers to undo transactions with their creditors pursuant to laws that exist only in 
federal bankruptcy cases. 
One of the most significant of these powers pertaining to payment status is what is 
colloquially called the "strong-arm" clause, which allows trustees to pick off unperfected 
liens on estate collateral. A flawed security interest, it avoided under the strong-arm 
power, has the lien transferred to the estate with the consequence of rendering the 
erstwhile secured creditor a general unsecured creditor, entitled only to whatever meager 
ividend that trickles down to the unwashed.26 The strong-arm clause implicatesa 
ic internal duty of loyalty tension that will be discussed in the following part. 
III .  TRUSTEE DUTIES 
1 muciary, p 
Anti-Fiduciary Obligations 
fulsome lict ( 3 COn£er'es duties under the Bankruptcy Code, which contait 
here).27 Non! r"J'0nsibllltles under Section 704 (a provision too long to reprod 
previously argued that aH described as "fiduciary," but commentators h 
frequent authnri S°me are' For examP'e, retired bankruptcy judge (: 
owed to the "b ^ diVideS trUStees' obhgat'ons into "fiduciary" obligatic 
"institutional" ohli COUrt and tbe parties in cases in which the trustee serves, 2 
§ tons, owed to the bankruptcy process itself," a serviceable 
U See Butn«r v. UnitedSutMW'59(l)' 6'' a"d 64 (UK)' 
- X l ?  - " ' C  ^ o .  
"ghout other Code Provisions! See,trustee has myriad other obligations s 
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slightly overbroad typology.28 While I agree with Rhodes that only some are fiduciary, 
I think analyzing the other obligations is equally as important because some are not just 
neutral, but thrust trustees into an antagonistic posture with the natural beneficiaries 
to whom they owe a duty of loyalty. Thus, my preferred sorting would be to say that the 
trustee has fiduciary, non-fiduciary, and (at the risk of being insufferable) "anti-fiduciary" 
obligations under the Code. 
1. Non-Fiduciary Duties 
Let's start with non-fiduciary duties. Although one can debate the correct labeling and 
classification, some obligations, while important, are clearly not fiduciary. For example, 
furnishing notice to certain domestic support creditors or transferring patients to health 
care facilities falls toward the ministerial/administrative end of a continuum building 
up to fiduciary obligations.29 
2. Fiduciary Duties 
As for what I would consider fiduciary duties, the absence of an explicit label of "fiduciary" 
does not undermine the Codes language that is clearly amenable to trigger such respon­
sibility, such as the obligation "to be accountable for all property received."30 Even neutral-
sounding assignments, such as the primary instruction to "collect and reduce to money 
the property of the estate for which such trustee serves," can be interpreted—as this one 
indeed has by courts—to impress upon trustees a fiduciary role.31 
The corollary is that some obligations that might sound like they are fiduciary "in the air" 
are not, upon closer inspection, in light of the trustees primary obligation to administer 
an estate. Consider perhaps the most vivid one from the debtor's perspective—the 
obligation "if advisable, to oppose the debtor's discharge."32 One could conceive of this 
as yet another obligation of the trustee to help creditors, and so fully consonant with the 
trustee's role as a fiduciary to creditors seeking collection. But that analysis is too quick, 
because the trustee has no obligation to improve the general welfare of creditors (they 
are not his general wards), nor even to cajole the debtor to offer voluntary repayments to 
creditors whose debts will be discharged by operation of federal law. 
Rather, the trustee has a fiduciary obligation to creditors limited to the property of the 
estate; what the debtor does in a post-bankruptcy world is of no concern to the trustee. 
By contrast, creditors may well care, because a debtor whose discharge is denied not 
only contributes bankruptcy estate property to the creditors but also continues to have a 
legal obligation to pay post-bankruptcy. On the other hand, creditors with an uncollectible 
28 Steven W. Rhodes, The Fiduciary and Institutional Obligations of a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee, 
80 Am. Bankr. L.J. 147,147-148 (2006). Others use different labels. Elizabeth H. McCullough, Bankruptcy 
Trustee Liability: Is There a Method in the Madness?, 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 153,162 (2011) (labeling 
some "functionary"). 
" 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(io), (12). 30 Id. § (a)(2). 
31 Id. § (a)(i). See, e.g., Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1,12 (2000); 
cf. Unif. Trust Code § 809 (Unif. Law Comm'n 2000) (duty to control trust property). 
32 n U.S.C. § 704(a)(6). 
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debtor don't want their dividends reduced by the trustee's (estate-compensated) public-
spirited pursuit of a discharge denial motion that yields them no more money. The trustee 
is thus given specific discretion to determine whether discharge opposition is "advisable," 
which some courts have interpreted to mean the trustee can let a discharge investigation 
drop if the creditors don't care (or have settled with the debtor for a compromise 
payment), while others have held an objection cannot be dropped if creditors have been 
bought off (at the very least, say these courts, it must be reported to the U.S. Trustee's 
Office).33 "No-drop" courts clearly rely on something beyond a trustee's fiduciary 
obligation to creditors, making the trustee a hybrid fiduciary/non-fiduciary to creditors 
under Section 704.34Thus, some obligations might be considered "faux fiduciary." 
3. Anti-Fiduciary Duties 
But non- (or faux-) fiduciary obligations are not the end of the matter, as some obliga­
tions are clearly antithetical to the creditors, the ostensible beneficiaries of the trustee's 
fiduciary duties. These might be considered "anti-fiduciarv." Consider Section 704(a) 
(4)'s instruction that "if a purpose would be served, examine proofs of claims and object 
to the allowance of any claim that is improper."35 Few creditors relish the prospect of the 
trustee sniffing around their claims, let alone objecting, which situates the usually sup­
portive trustee in a sometimes adversarial posture. This necessary awkwardness under­
scores the intrinsically conflicting nature of the multiparty nature of bankruptcy: when 
there is collective resolution of a debtor's general default, a menagerie of heterogeneous 
creditors emerges. A creditor whose claim objection is sustained gets less money, which 
trickles down to other co-creditors. Trustees thus find themselves sometimes opposed to 
creditors they normally champion.36 
Appreciating the complexity of the trustee's duties, which are sometimes downright 
anti-fiduciary in my characterization, do bankruptcy courts nonetheless generally tend 
to consider them on the whole as triggering fiduciary obligations? Absolutely. Courts 
repeatedly remark that trustees—and hence Chapter 11 DIPs—are "fiduciaries" who owe 
R<D°I^o>are 'n/e ^en' 259 B.R. 586,591 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2001) (approving), with In re Levint 
nffi ' ( ,?'/°' *Bankr' ED' Mich- 2002) (disapproving). See generally U.S. Dep't of Justice, Executiv 
/nHvatp t t T™kstees'for Chapter 7 Trustees § 4.G, 29 (2002), http://wwsv.usd0j.g0v/ust/e. 
trustee to fUS ^ A C aPter07'd°cs'forms/Ch7hbo702-2005.pdf [hereinafter Handbook] (instructin 
trustee to forward information to US. Trustee). 
ruptcy process""' *8' ^ 202-209 (°P'n'ng trustees must "protect the integrity of the bank 
33 u U.S.C. § 704(a)(4). 
is solvent and ah rreA J re'eVant in inte™ediate" cases with some unsecured distribution. If the estat 
trustee. And if the estl^l! ̂  ®ett'n® ^"y paid, only the debtor cares about claims inflation, not th 
claims that will all be d^chame^^ t tfUStee ^ Sh°Uld ^ ab°Ut thC Pr°Per ca,Cula,i°n ° 
claims in no asset cases would be truste f Pfyment (1rhe only reason for PursuinS revieW C 
(9th Cir. 1991).) Courts have settled e"churnm8-In re Riverside-Linden Investors, 925 F^d 320,32 
appropriate, there is no furth • °" 3 pra8matic "prima facie" standard: if a claim looks prima faci l̂ 4 7^^s.^So^,,8aao,l required absem party °bjecti°n- E-g-in re Atcal1, * 
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traditional obligations of care and loyalty to the estate and its creditors.37 Even the 
professional canons concede many trustee obligations are fiduciary.38 Accordingly, 
while noting these complex nuances on the trustees responsibilities, it is appropriate now 
to consider the primary duties of care and loyalty and how they constrain the trustee, 
flagging especially how the structural tension of the trustee as fiduciary/anti-fiduciary 
manifests itself when beneficiary interests conflict.39 
B. Content of the Duty of Care: Relative Clarity 
As mentioned, characterization of trustee duties as "fiduciary" does not appear in the 
Code, and so it is unsurprising the statute lacks explication of the duty of care. Indeed, 
bankruptcy courts repeatedly reference non-Code "general" provisions of fiduciary law, 
suggesting trustees are governed by a federal common law. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
pronounced, "By the common law, every trustee or receiver of an estate has the duty of 
exercising reasonable care in the custody of the fiduciary estate."40 This common law 
standard, drawing from trust law, has been articulated as that required by "an ordinarily 
prudent person."41 
Common law fiduciary duties of care supplement statutory obligations imposed by 
the Code. Courts emphasize Section 704 as a floor, not a ceiling, to the proper discharge 
of bankruptcy trustees qua fiduciaries. "Beyond the statutory duties, bankruptcy 
trustees owe to the beneficiaries of the estate the usual common law trust duties.... "42 
Because the content of the duty of care is federal common law, courts have turned to 
general principles, such as the Restatement of Trusts, to delineate its content.43 (There 
are, however, some dissenters.44) Finally, it should be noted that duty of care issues are 
functionally regulated by the statutory "competence" requirement for trustees under 
the Code.45 Thus, the real work typical duty of care litigation performs in regular trust 
law is probably done ofFstage in insolvency, such as by the empaneling procedures of 
the U.S. Trustee's office and administrative proceedings removing trustees,46 which 
^ E.g., Stalnaker v. DLC, Ltd., 376 F.3d 819, 825 (8th Cir. 2004). 
See NABT Canon of Ethics, Canon 2 (2005). 
Some cases hold corporate DIPs only to a business judgment rule duty of care, e.g., In re Mirant 
Corp., 348 B.R. 725, 744 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006), but this line has been criticized. See Kelch, supra note 
20, at 1342 n.88. 
United States ex rel. Willoughby v. Howard, 302 U.S. 445, 450 (1938). On trust law "prudence," see 
Robert H. Sitkoff, Fiduciary Principles in Trust Law, this volume. 
<2 'n re Ebel, 338 B.R. 862,875 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2005). 
^ In re Markos Gurnee P ship, 182 B.R. 211, 219 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1995). 
^ See, e.g., In re Ferrante, 51 F.3d 1473,1479-1480 (9th Cir. 1995)-
See In re Schipper, 933 F.2d 513,516 (7th Cir. 1991) (declining to supplement Code's text). 
^ u U.S.C. § 321(a). 
( $ 58.6; Case No. 05-0004, Decision by Acting Director Clifford J. White III, 6 
ov. i, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/rules_regulations/admin_decisions/docs/caseo50004.htm 
our-month suspension for inadequate debtor investigation). 
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are designed to police competence.47 As such, duty of care cases raise few noteworthy 
issues in insolvency law.48 
C. Content (and Beneficiaries) of the Duty of 
Loyalty: Relative Chaos 
The duty of loyalty raises far more complex (and intractable) issues in bankruptcy. As 
previously mentioned, bankruptcy raises unique conflicts among claimants, all of whom 
are ostensibly served by the trustee. The thornier those conflicts get, the less certainty 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty (or even impartiality) seems to provide courts. In consider­
ing these trustees loyalty difficulties, it might be helpful first to distinguish "external" 
from "internal" conflicts of trustee loyalty. 
1. External Conflicts: (Mostly) Clear Fiduciary Obligations 
By external conflicts, I mean adversarial conflicts between a trustee himself and the 
bankruptcy estate stakeholders. For example, a self-dealing trustee who profits on his 
own account violates a duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries.49 To guard against such tempta­
tions, the Code explicitly requires "disinterestedness" as an eligibility criterion to serve.50 
This statutory requirement replicates the common law of trusts,51 and Congress provides 
extensive (and fairly rigid) definitional guidance on disinterestedness.52 Even criminal 
law is implicated.53 
Case law, however, has glossed some flexibility on this statutory definition. Trustees, for 
example, can serve in multiple related estates under certain circumstances, even if there 
is a potential for cross-claims.54 And trustees can, and often do, employ themselves as 
awyers for the bankruptcy estate.55 (The requirement of disinterestedness also applies 
to attorneys who seek to serve the estate, beyond whatever constraints are imposed by 
apposite rules of professional conduct.56) The DIP, of course, could never satisfy the 
Detent "hv vi2'5 ̂ ^ '4°'141-142 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997) (finding trustee "obviously" com-
Cf LI 8 3 mCmber °f tKe U"ited S,ates Pen­
ary dutv n°'e 2°'21 ^4° ' atternPf'ngt0 find - a definition of the content of the fiduci­
ary duty of the_debtonnpossession, the lack of any unified concept becomes evident."). 
grounds, 847 F.2d 931, gsofot O^uLd"'4'3 (D'RR" '987)' aff'd ^ a"d P"' °" "'T 
property was "self-dealing" and "conflict of^trest") mar"age receptl0n °" 
50 11 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). 
" " S "" M 54 ^ ^ V U.b.L. § I54. 
P. 2009(c)(2)) Trust law nro°a'nC ' 4,01 391' 412 (Bar|kr. D. Minn. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Bankr. 
(c)(7) (Am. Law Inst. 2003k analoSous flexibility. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78 cmt. 
U.S.C. § 327(^)1 see slcn 
reported employing themsdv*. !?'SUpra note 28'at 161 n-67 (referencing poll where 78% of trustees 
(c)(5) (Am. Law Inst 2002! fro A " gectlon 327(d)); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78 crat. 
56 »U.S.C. § 327(a) mng emPloyment). 
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disinterestedness test, and so has no requirement of disinterestedness imposed.57 In 
sum, the duty of loyalty for "external" temptations to the trustees is largely what might 
be expected, perhaps with some overspecificity accorded by the statutory strictures of 
the Code. Fiduciary law (trusts) robustly supplements the Code, aided by the adminis­
trative apparatus of the EOUST. 
2. Internal Conflicts: Divided Case Law with Uncertain 
Fiduciary Obligations 
"Internal" loyalty issues raise different concerns that, if not unique, are somewhat 
intrinsic to insolvency: how the trustee polices competing conflicts among the consti­
tutive beneficiaries he serves. Three illustrative skirmishes demonstrate the difficulties 
courts have deploying the duties of loyalty and impartiality regarding the trustees divergent 
beneficiaries: secured creditor versus, unsecured creditor, unsecured creditor versus 
unsecured creditor, and creditors generally versus the debtor. 
To start, the trustee is supposed to be "impartial," in the language of trust law: 
A Chapter 7 trustee occupies a unique position. He is charged with impartially admin­
istering the estate entrusted to him. He is the representative of all the creditors.... At 
times he must propose action that may be detrimental to particular creditors or 
oppose requests that may be favorable to others.58 
Thus, bankruptcy judges are sympathetic to the competing demands on trustee loyal­
ties. But this sympathy has not resulted in detailed specification in case law, just vague 
incantations of impartiality. And trust law's translation of the duty of impartiality into 
not, in fact, requiring impartiality but rather "due regard" for the divergent interests of 
beneficiaries has not been picked up in bankruptcy (although I am doubtful it could 
offer much help).59 Rather, judicial solicitude for the trustees plight simply manifests 
itself in the diffuse generalization of the trustee's fiduciary duties being owed to 
the estate."60 The Supreme Court concurs that, in insolvency, a corporate DIP's fidu­
ciary duties run expansively to "the corporation," including its shareholders and its 
creditors.61 As one commentator laments, "[T]he fiduciary duty that adheres to this 
Cf. id. § 1104(b) (permitting DIP's professionals to have previously represented debtor). 
In re Computer Learning Ctrs., Inc., 268 B.R. 468, 473 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001) (holding Code 
requires "balance"). 
See Robert H. Sitkoff & Jesse Dukeminier, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 667 (10th ed. 2005). Trust law's 
nty of impartiality is implicated mostly in the principal-vs.-income beneficiaries tension. See Sitkoff, 
supra note 40. My skepticism of its utility to bankruptcy is that in trust law there are (1) generally fewer 
stakeholders and (2) a frequent workaround of explicit specification in the trust document itself of rules 
or resolving/absolving conflicting duties. See also Unif. Trust Code § 803 (Unif. Law Commn 2010) 
«Uty °f ImPartial'ty"); Scott and Asher on Trusts § 17.15 (5th ed. 1995) ("Duty of Impartiality"). 
^ See, e.g., In re JMW Auto Sales, 494494 B.R. 877,893 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013). 
CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,355 (1985) ("The fiduciary duty of the trustee runs to shareholders 
are well as creditors.... One of the painful facts of bankruptcy is that the interests of shareholders become 
subordinated to the interests of creditors."). Note even the Supreme Court's vacillation between shifting 
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role of debtor in possession is a broad one with a host of beneficiaries. It is the number 
and diversity of beneficiaries of this fiduciary duty that causes its undoing as a useful 
concept for analysis for conduct."62 
I. SECURED CREDITORS 
Notwithstanding this broad obligation to maximize the interests of everyone, there are 
repeat scenarios in which constituencies conflict, and bankruptcy law has struggled to 
apply "winners" of the fiduciary duty. Consider the tension immanent in the strong-arm 
clause and its consequences for the trustees duty of loyalty. '1 his avoiding power pits 
secured creditor against unsecured creditor, both apparent beneficiaries of the trustee's 
loyalty. Moreover, an unsecured creditor generally lacks standing to pursue an avoid­
ance action. Thus, only if the trustee decides to move forward will the secured creditor 
be at risk. Why should a trustee expend time and effort litigating against one beneficiary 
for the benefit of another (more likely, others)?63 
Nothing in the Code dictates an obligation to do so other than the general command 
to examine claims,64 which could subsume an obligation to examine the perfected status 
of a secured claim. Yet case law has created just such a duty, albeit tempered. Indeed, 
most cases considering the matter do not see secured and unsecured creditors as equal 
subjects of the trustees protections. On the contrary, they say that secured creditors can 
look out for themselves, and thus the trustees "primary" obligation is to unsecured 
creditors.65 This approach is tempered, however, by a plausibility threshold, suggesting 
the trustees obligation is not to rack up fees scouring every single lien on the estate, but 
only when some initial indicia of litigability is raised. The bankruptcy rules reflect this 
thinking. (Of course, this tempering of the trustee's obligation is coupled with an 
unsecured creditors committee in Chapter 11, which has a greater watchdog role in 
policing the conduct of the "trustee" that is a DIP.67) The corollary, then, is that if the 
validity of a secured creditors perfected status is doubtful, the trustee, acting for the 
unsecured creditors, should object. 
The strong-arm clause perhaps is a special case: What's the point of having the strong-
arm avoiding power that only the trustee has standing to implement if the trustee has no 
Tantiv LJ, rS VMSUS Shifti"8 diffedy t0 creditors in action to shareholders. As one of th< 
Chapter trule °bSerVeS> the C0rP0rate board ^ams r"idu*' duties even when ' 
T Mar,i" '• Bienenstock. Conflicts Between Management and the Deb.o, 
Possessions Fiduciary Duties, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 543, 547 (1992) ., , , - •543,547 (1992). 
Ketch, supra note 20, at 1336. 
65 In re Dinh 'i!?! {tYing trUStee'S comPensation to recovery). 64 Id. § 704(a)(5). 
that a trustee's primary duw8"/^' S'°' M'SS'198?) ("[Ilt 'S a fundamental concept in bankruptc; 
secured creditors... should beabt J loTt'Credit0rS rather than t0 ,he secured creditors'(Th' 
e to look to their collateral for satisfaction of their claims.); In r 
ikr.r ' -
-riv7 K1 ^ceding! 
erty in which they claim an interest."). 
Schwen's, Inc., tg B.R 6»! ruWR1'6/0 ' b b collateral for s tisf cti  f t eir clai s."); In r 
to monitor the bankruptcy nrnreell- ° '9Sl'' "Secured creditors have a duty and responsibilit 
erty in which they claim an intp t0 informed of the action taken with respect to prop 
See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f). « u u $ c ( 
> 1102,1103. 
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fiduciary obligation to use it?68 But the case law talking about the trustees "primary" 
duty to the unsecured creditors and not the secureds is far from limited to the strong-
arm clause. Another area in which the trustees obligations to a secured creditor arise 
involves the maintenance and preservation of collateral.69 Recall that the bankruptcy 
estate comprises all property of the debtor, even that fully encumbered by consensual 
lien. Why would a trustee want to hold onto such property, let alone incur expenses to 
maintain it? The short answer is, he doesn't, and, indeed, often abandons it back to the 
secured creditor (if the secured creditor doesn't beat him to the punch with a lift-stay 
motion).70 But unless and until that happens, the secured creditor cannot take the 
property back without violating the automatic stay.71 
So what happens in the interim if the property requires upkeep? Consider a property 
insurance premium: Should the trustee pay it? If the estate is deeply insolvent, perhaps 
even to the point where recovery of the trustee's own fees are in question, there is no 
incentive to waste scarce funds on collateral that will not generate any return to the 
estate (recall the trustee himself takes fees out of the estate). Congress has included Section 
506(c) to allow the trustee to "surcharge" the collateral with such expenses, exactly to 
combat this economic disincentive.72 But Section 506 does not answer the question of 
fiduciary duty. While the question might be seen as pertaining to the duty of care (Does 
the trustee have to do X?), it really is a question of the duty of loyalty (Does the trustee 
have to do X for Y?).73 Section 506 simply states what to do if the trustee does incur the 
cost of the premium. But it doesn't answer the fiduciary question: Must the trustee act 
because of his fiduciary duty to the secured creditor?74 
Some courts have said so. "Procuring insurance would ordinarily be an integral part 
of the trustee's duty [to secured creditors]."75 They build upon general principles that the 
fiduciary duty [flows] to all creditors, not just the unsecured creditors."76 On the other 
hand, contrary cases pick favorites and hold that although the duty extends to all creditors, 
the "primary duty" is to fight for the unsecured creditors and not the secured creditors.77 
Cf. In re Pearson Indus., 178 B.R. 753,767 (Bankr. C.D. 111. 1995) (no duty to pursue voidable prefer­
ence absent benefit to estate); see generally In re Nettel Corp., 364 B.R. 433,441-442 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2006) 
(taking capacious definition of "estate" to include secured creditor). 
7i 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(2). 70 Id. §§ 362(d), 554. 
See, e.g., In re Burns, 503 B.R. 666, 673-675, 680 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2013) (holding refrigerator 
repossession willful stay violation). 
u U.S.C. § 506(c) (requiring expenses "benefit" secured creditor). 
Substantial case law holds that the trustee is not supposed to represent any individual creditor, but 
the collective. See, e.g., In re DigitalBridge Holdings, Inc., No. 10-34499,2015 WL 5766761 at *4 (Bankr. 
• Utah Sept. 30,2015) (holding trustee pursuing adversary proceeding must represent all or no creditors 
but may not represent only some). Relatedly, the trustee has no obligation to "save" individual creditors 
and indeed must object to late-filed claims. See, e.g., In re Lyon, No. 11-50343, 2011 WL 5299229, at *2 
(Bankr. WD. N.C.Nov. 2,2011). 
;j ^ Sitkoff & Dukeminier, supra note 59, at 595 ("Difference Between Power and Duty"). 
^ In re Kinross Mfg. Corp., 174 B.R. 702,706 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994)-
n I" re Troy D°dson Constr. Co., 993 F.2d 1211,1216 (5th Cir. 1993). 
. me ®°so t0 ubjure any duty to secureds. See, e.g., In re NETtel Corp., Inc., 364 B.R. 433, 441 
r D.C. 2006) (holding trustee's fiduciary obligations "run only to a debtor's unsecured creditors.'). 
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Thus, some have held precisely the opposite: when no value will to flow to the estate 
(as the secured creditor will reap all the collateral's benefit), the trustee has no duty to 
expend estate funds to procure insurance. "The secured creditor must exercise reasona­
ble diligence to protect the property serving as security. The trustee must also exercise 
diligence to conserve the assets of the bankruptcy estate, but he is not relegated to the 
role of'babysitter' for the secured creditors."78 These courts believe the secured creditor 
can just as easily—more easily, in fact—pay the premium if it wants the collateral to be 
insured.79 In sum, whatever the jurisprudential platitudes about trustees being fiducia­
ries to "all creditors," when loyalty-dividing issues of secured creditor versus unsecured 
creditors arise, it seems that some fiduciary conflicts are resolved in favor of unsecured 
creditors on the backs of the secureds, with many courts unapologetically touting the 
trustee's "primary" obligation toward the unsecureds. One court has gone so far to call 
secured creditors "the trustee's statutory adversaries."80 
Normative theory is sadly beyond the scope of this chapter, but a few quick explanations 
for this jurisprudential line of beneficiary stratification present themselves. On a redistrib-
utive impulses level, it could be that bankruptcy judges generally favor the unsecured 
creditor as the "little guy," given the numerous Code provisions that treat secured credit so 
favorably;81 they believe that otherwise hapless unsecureds need all the help they can get 
(or, more precisely, in a near-zero-sum distributive bankruptcy world, the secured credi­
tors don t need the trustee's help as much as a zealous fiduciary). Or it could be an armchair 
empirical assumption that unsecured creditors of an insolvent estate are often the "resid­
ual claimants, and hence the fulcrum class to whom the trustee's obligations ought be 
owed in cases of inter-creditor conflict. This assumption has been rightly questioned.82 
For example, it is more likely to be true in consumer cases than in uncertain corporate 
valuation cases. Whatever the justification, a strand of fiduciary law may be emerging: 
the trustee is more beneficial" for unsecured creditors than secured.83 But it is contested. 
II.  PRIORITY UNSECURED CREDITORS 
Slicing the bologna even finer, what happens when there are conflicts among unse-
cured creditors inter se? Section 507 accords special priority to certain unsecured 
78 In re Dinh, 80 B.R. 819,823 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1987). 
the Trusted rnl^f ̂ n^aU^'j^° 865> 869 (®ankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (holding otherwise "would shift 
the responsibility «TtSta^^tAtment ma"a8er thereby enC0Uragi"g SeCUred Cred,t°rS^ 
: , ED- Enctel?rises- "3 B.R. 6.0,628 (Bankr. D. Mass. t998) 
8j See, e.g., „u.S.C.§§ 506,1129(b)(1). 
Colum L Rev^ii, ^ ̂  I*awrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107 u2i£?Z, ™"h ",on*h«l ,o ht,rV,SA h* 
Hu and Westbrook also challenge thTT CUf°mers started a nsky new business or took up skydiving. )• 
ment decisions than stockholders Id assumPtlon that corporate creditors prefer less risky mvest-
Court in Weintraub hUtedata^[h!Tt distnbufions is not found in Section 704's duty list. The Supreme 
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 345 /, „ , , ,ra seeking to maximize the value of the estate," CFTC v. 
assets" after considering cnllJ!-- W tbe Seventh Circuit economically glosses as maximizing net 
Co.. „ $ tth dr. ,«>.» 
anaoook. Rhodes, supra note 28, at 168 n.92. 
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creditors' claims.84 Does the trustee have an obligation to investigate these claims, too, 
perhaps to uncover whether priority assertions are trumped up? Or may the trustee 
take a passive role unless and until someone pipes up? Here, the case law is scanter, so 
I reached out to some bankruptcy judges, trustees, and counsel for anecdotal guidance. 
I am informed that while the issue doesn't arise frequently and that many overworked 
trustees usually just take claims as given if nobody fusses, occasionally trustees do dig in 
on a bold creditor proclamation of priority status. One sage colleague who has worked 
as a trustee in complex cases for decades said this: 
As to priority claims, I have to object to a number of claims in which the creditor 
alleges priority. An unsecured creditor will often file as a priority claim hoping that 
I will miss the lack of priority. Wage claimants will often overstate their priority 
when wages are generally limited to priority for ninety days prior to filing. Usually 
I am the person filing a claim objection because of claimed priority or as an admin­
istrative expense claim.85 
Why would there not be the same enthusiasm to go after priority creditors as secured 
creditors? If the theoretical foundation for the rule that unsecured creditors get 
primary" trustee loyalty over secured creditors is the unsecured creditors' occupation 
as the fulcrum class of residual claimants, then one would expect an equal application to 
general unsecureds when a conflict is with a priority unsecured: the trustee should pre­
sumably look out for residual claimants and fight the priority claim. Yet this does not 
seem to be uniformly the case, at least based on my anecdotal survey, which might be 
evidence for the judicially favored redistribution hypothesis. Many priority unsecured 
creditors are from disempowered constituencies (domestic support, employees, etc.).86 
Or perhaps simply trustees remember that they, too, receive priority repayment!87 The 
point is that once again, fiduciary law is doing limited work, with no uniform case law 
on how to resolve these conflicts. 
I I I .  D E B T O R  
Finally, conflicts between creditors and the debtor seem to run in the opposite direction. 
Here, cases repeatedly hold that the trustee's fiduciary loyalty does not flow to the 
debtor, even though technically the debtor is the estate's ultimate residual beneficiary.88 
For example, even though not in the trustee's list of responsibilities under Section 704, 
courts have created a trustee duty to scrutinize (and if indicated, object to) the debtor's 
n U.S.C. § 507. 
Emai' ^rom Christopher Redmond, Esq., Partner, Husch Blackwell, to author (June 14, 2017, 8:45 
) (on file with author). Chris estimates claims objection incidence as 95% of the time the trustee, 4% 
1 e debtor, and 1% some other party (e.g., another creditor). Id. This obligation to kick the beneficiary's 
tires might surprise trust lawyers; it stems from a deep-rooted bankruptcy norm of pro rata distribution. 
""U.S.C. SS  507(a)(1), (a)(3). 
Id- § (a)(2). Note that the compensation structure for trustees incentivizes recoveries for the unse-
cure creditors, with no special treatment for priority. See id. § 326(a); cf. id. § 507(a)(1)(C) (special 
ru8satee Priority f°r domestic support creditors). 
Id- § 726. 
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exemptions.89 This cannot be explained away by the Code's instruction to trustees to 
object when advisable to the debtors discharge,90 because trustees have an equal if not 
more explicit statutory instruction to examine creditors' claims.91 Courts upholding 
this obligation candidly admit it comes indirectly from the Code, gamely trying various 
hooks.92 The weak statutory foundations mean that courts are driven by what they see as 
the trustee's duty to unsecured creditors, and to work for unsecured creditors against the 
debtor when their interests disalign. At least sometimes, therefore, conflicting demands 
on a trustee's loyalty are not so difficult to resolve: the debtor loses.93 Fiduciary dutv, 
however, is not guiding, but providing constructed ex post justification, for resolution 
of this conflict. 
3. Debtor-in-Possession Redux: A Pragmatic Refocus? 
The foregoing loyalty discussion has considered the typical Chapter 7 case with an 
appointed trustee. The Chapter 11 (DIP) context presents a noteworthy contrast: where 
fiduciary law, beyond ritual incantations, does even less work than structural provisions 
of the bankruptcy system that may be designed as a pragmatic mitigation of these 
loyalty conflicts. 
Consider that the DIP-controlled debtor nominally holds the same fiduciary duties 
to creditors, albeit with some exceptions. First, the DIP (absent self-loathing) is unlikely 
to vigorously pursue actions against the debtor. Fortunately, the paradigmatic case from 
consumer bankruptcy of trustee v. debtor—an exemption fight—won't arise in a corporate 
Chapter 11 because corporations don't get exemptions. Nonetheless, it would be foolish 
to deny the policy tension with the DIP serving as fiduciary for often antithetically situ­
ated stakeholders; few Chapter 11 debtors enjoy rosy relations with their creditors when 
they file for bankruptcy.94 The Code responds to this structural tension with some 
built-in safety valves. First, the Code allows for DIP removal for "cause," which includes 
incompetence and misconduct.95 Although incompetence more aptly invokes the fidu­
ciary uty of care, the duty of loyalty is also implicated. For example, a glaring security 
"routine")6 N°' 14"6'483' 2°'5 WL 3536l°2' at *4 n'5 (Bankr 
; Id- § 704(a)(5). 
nowhere specifically'LntionldiShoueh't "^7 "eCeSSary °b'ect t0' claimed exemPtio1 
financial affairs of the debtor'" (auotinfs 15 s"bsamed Wlthln the 8eneral duty t0 'inwst,8ate 
(1st Cir. 1997) (referencing % 707^1 V w- 7°7(a)(4)): see also In re Edmonston, 107 Fjd 74, 7' 
93 No court wants to J. 7f S °bl'gatlon as "implicitly" providing basis for duty). 
v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,353 77! ̂ "° '°yalty dutieS t0 the debt0r at a"'Cf'C' 
courts have taken the deh'tr, t iporate debtors loyalty duty is to the "corporation"). And si 
ment; complaining trustee was unduW 7 j6 trustee for takin8 easy settlement on appeal of jt 
residual interest). U on creciitors' risk-aversion, not debtor's shareholc 
94 Some 
supra note 20, at 1351-1352,135" n 13° St3r'< 3S l° ma^e tbe fiduciary obligations questionable. See Kf 
95 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).' ' L 
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interest imperfection—perhaps a lapsed financing statement—not pursued by the 
DIP would surely ground a motion to appoint a trustee as inexplicable secured creditor 
favoritism.56 
Now, who would cajole the DIP to bring such a motion?97 This question segues into 
the second Chapter 11 safeguard: the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. As its 
name suggests, the Creditors Committee participates formally and may access the DIP's 
records.98 It can weigh in on pending litigation and can even recommend approval/ 
disapproval of a reorganization plan (and, when the exclusivity period expires, propose 
its own plan).99 Perhaps most importantly, it draws funding from the estate to employ 
counsel to scrutinize the DIP's actions—a considerable henhouse check on the fox.100 
Cases have explicitly held that the Committee can bring litigation otherwise available 
to the DIP if the DIP wrongly refuses to do so.101 
A final structural check is the bankruptcy court itself, which, by statute, must approve 
certain transactions that outside bankruptcy would escape scrutiny. For example, sale/ 
use of estate property outside the ordinary course of business, or use of cash collateral, 
requires court approval.102 Thus, numerous Code provisions seem designed to acknowl­
edge the intrinsic "external" loyalty tension of the DIP model's fiduciary obligation to 
erstwhile adversaries. These offsetting checks also address "internal" loyalty conflicts 
by inserting the judge as arbiter, thus serving as a pragmatic response to the DIP's 
conflicting allegiances (as opposed to relying on litigation to delineate the scope of the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty).103 
IV. REMEDIES 
Among the more convoluted topics in bankruptcy are the rules for when trustees can be 
sued for breaches of their duties (fiduciary and others). The case law is often contradic­
tory, but some coherence emerges, and there is a recurrent theme of trustee solicitude, 
likely reflecting a recognition of the impossibility of the trustee serving every divergent 
constituent satisfactorily. 
To begin, however, we should pause to consider nonlitigation sanctions. The U.S. 
Trustee's office can strike trustees from their rolls and so repeat play/reputational 
" Cf. In re Biolitec, Inc., No. 13-11157, 2013 WL1352302, at *9 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 3,2013) (appointing 
trustee when DIP declined to pursue glaring secured creditor preferences). 
Note that in Chapter 13, there is dispute whether the debtor or standing trustee has standing to 
pursue lien avoidance given the Chapter 13 debtor's vesting in many of the trustee's powers. Compare In 
re Cohen, 305 B.R. 886,900 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (debtor), with In re Binghi, 299 B.R. 300,306 (Bankr. 
2003) (standing trustee). 
101 U $ 1103- 99 Id. § 1121(c). 100 Id. §§ 330,1103. 
102 "*ee'e'®'' re Enron Corp., 319 B.R. 128,132 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004). 
103 5 US'C' ^ 363(b)(1), (c)(2). 
See generally Bienenstock, supra note 61 (cataloging other DIP loyalty checks). 
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constraints provide strong administrative discipline.104 And trustees are required to 
post a bond for exercising their duties "faithful [ly]," which trigger forfeiture upon proper 
showing.105 Thus, even aside from case law, there are nonlitigation constraints on 
trustee fiduciary behavior. Nonetheless, litigation abounds. Perhaps recognizing the 
conflict-laden challenges trustees structurally face (and the baseline unhappiness of 
creditors in bankruptcy), numerous protective doctrines for trustees exist that should be 
understood before considering the grounds upon which trustees can be sued for breach. 
A. Defense: Immunities and Bars 
The principal issue in trustee litigation is the trustees personal liability. The trustee does, 
however, have standing to sue and be sued on behalf of the estate in her official capacity, 
which can be addressed quickly.106 
1. Official Capacity Bar: The Barton Doctrine 
The two types of lawsuits the trustee officially pursues are actions of the debtor—causes 
to which the trustee succeeds as plaintiff—and actions for all creditors' collective benefit, 
such as fraudulent conveyance suits.107 Lawsuits against the trustee in his official capac­
ity face a jurisdictional common law bar called the Barton rule. In Barton v. Barbour, the 
Supreme Court established that suits against trustees in connection with estate admin­
istration require the appointing courts leave.108 For example, a state court tort action 
against^the receiver in her official capacity had to be dismissed absent the receiver courts 
eave. Thus, as a pleading matter, most putative plaintiffs sue the trustee in their 
personal capacities.110 
2. Personal Capacity Bar: The Derivative Immunity Doctrine 
f sued personally, a trustee can always assert immunity, which will also be grounds 
yirig arton leave. This absolute quasi-judicial immunity," or immunity "derived" 
f i ru^tees aPP°inting court, immunizes the trustee from suit within the scope 
capacities. Courts uniformly extending this immunity to bankruptcy 
i.8uS?m6TOU?n7 TPenSi°n a"d procedures). 
517 (Bankr. N.D. Tex 2010) " ̂  Suretles' do '"deed get burnt. See In re Schooler, 449 B.R. 5o: 
107 Id^f 566 alS°o8d'§ 3"(„C) ('mmunizing trustee for debtor's malfeasance). 
i°9 ca 1 rJ1 104 U.S. 126,136-137 (1881} 
for carrying on business." This is refi 959(a), which clarifies that trustees/DIPs can be suei 
. CITlcnt, not &br02«ltion. nf Rnrtnn ka/*inrn marJir /-rtr»f4»rc nrHin31" jurisdiction for civil suits (e g if thennTpent'001 a')ro8atl ' °f Barton, because it merely confers ordinal 
Crown Vantage, 421 Fjd 963, g7I p6"'6" and t'len breaches a contract to supply goods). See In 1 
trustee or other officer is actuallv nr, Jl°!' ̂  'Section 959's] limited exception applies only if tf 
Mollis v. US. Bankr Ct ffi^thebMiness""">-
" 828 E2d '390 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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trustees build upon Supreme Court precedents on judicial immunity,112 which protect 
the free exercise of official discretion without fear of litigation.113 For example, trustees 
have an obligation (clearly institutional, not fiduciary) to refer to criminal prosecu­
tion conduct they believe is suspicious and so enjoy an absolute bar to malicious pros­
ecution suit.114 
Not all exercises of trustee authority trigger derivative immunity. Which ones 
do depends upon classification along an "administrative/functional" to "judicial/ 
discretionary" continuum, stemming from the Court's decision in Forrester v. White,115 
as refined by a more categorical historical two-part test in Antoine v. Byers & Anderson.116 
This division follows from the trustee's immunity's conceptual origin injudicial immu­
nity, as not all judges' actions enjoy absolute judicial immunity. (Forrester involved the 
judge demoting a probation officer, which was not an exercise of judicial power needing 
protection.117) Bankruptcy trustees, like judges, are "hybrid officials]" who exercise some 
judicial-discretionary functions but also many administrative tasks, thus requiring 
case-by-case immunity analysis.118 
3. Scope of the Duty Bar: The McNulta Doctrine (and 
Instructions Defense) 
Moreover, even if the trustee's authority is on the nonjudicial side of the Forrester-
Antoine ledger and hence unprotected by derivative immunity, the trustee still enjoys 
alternative immunity from personal suit under the McNulta doctrine. Dating back to 
the Supreme Court case McNulta v. Lochridge,119 this additional immunity depends 
on the plaintiff: third parties are treated more dismissively than creditors to whom the 
trustee owes a fiduciary duty.120 If a third party sues the trustee in her personal capacity, 
the trustee can assert McNulta, which immunizes the trustee for actions performed 
within the scope of his duties.121 The only exception is ultra vires conduct, i.e., that the 
trustee was acting outside the scope of his assigned responsibilities. Such cases are 
uncommon, but always interesting.122 
112 See, e.g., Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cir. 1981); Howard v. Leonard, 101 B.R. 421, 
423 (D. N.J. 1989) ("[TJrustees immunity is derived from that afforded to the bankruptcy judge— ); 
Gonzalez v. Musso, No. 08-CV-3026, 2008 WL 3194179, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2008) ("[ TJrustee will 
enjoy absolute immunity so long as he does not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, or at least acts 
under the supervision of the bankruptcy judge." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
"J See Forrester v. White, 484 US. 219, 223 (1988) ("(Tjhreat of liability can create perverse incentives 
that operate to inhibit officials in the proper performance of their duties."). 
^ 18 U.S.C. § 3057(a). 1,5 484 U.S. 219, 227-228(1988). 
508 U.S. 429, 432, 436 (1993) (assessing "immunity historically accorded [to] the relevant official 
and whether officials discretionary judgments are "functionally comparable to that of a judge ) (internal 
citations omitted). 
11s 484 at 230 (not'ng judge might enjoy qualified immunity). 
119 *n rC ^astl"°. 297 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 2002). 
in 141 327 120 See id. at 332. 
111 8ee'e'®'' re Markos Gurnee P'ship, 182 B.R. 211,216-217 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1995)-
See, e.g., In re United Engg. & Contracting Co., 151 N.Y.S. 120 (N.Y. App. Div. 1915) (finding trustee 
personally liable with no McNulta immunity for horses run amok absent authorization to run business). 
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Finally, even if the trustee's conduct is not immune under the foregoing doctrines, 
there is still one final bite at the apple: immunity by virtue of court approval. This doc­
trine harks back to the seminal case of Morris v. Darrow, in which the Supreme Court in 
finding a trustee liable for breach of fiduciary duty chided the trustee for not following 
"well established" practice in trust law of "seek[ing] instructions from the court, given 
upon notice to creditors and other interested parties, as to matters which involve diffi­
cult questions of judgment."123 Building on this rationale, modern courts have granted 
trustees immunity when acting "with the explicit approval of a bankruptcy court... as 
long as there has been full and frank disclosure to creditors and the court."124 
B. Offense: Standard of Care for Breach 
So what is left for a trustee to be sued upon in his personal capacity? Breach of fiduciary 
duty. This is only available to "second party" plaintiffs, e.g., creditors to whom the bank­
ruptcy trustee owes fiduciary obligations. But the extent ot the trustee's dutv is once 
again unclear due to convoluted precedent. The cryptic Alosser case is to blame, and has 
caused a three-way circuit split. In Mosser, a railroad reorganization receiver poorly super­
vised his employees, who ended up trading in securities they sold the estate. The case is 
interesting because the trustee appeared hapless: he made no personal gain himself, just 
the faithless agents did. In fact, it's not clear the estate itself lost money (the agents "merely" 
profited, although the Court acknowledged the estate's foregone opportunity).125 
In holding the trustee liable, the Court used language that has puzzled subsequent 
analysts. [W]e see no room for the operation of principles of negligence in a case in 
which conduct has been knowingly authorized.'"26 In the Court's view, this was an easy-
case of surcharging the trustee with personal liability because the agents were not going 
behind his back, but following a plan to trade securities the trustee himself innocently 
but unwisely approved. But "no room for negligence" could be read to mean that negligence 
S|t° r k?01 St'le re'evant standard> °nly something higher, before a trustee is person-
^ u S ^ C°U'^ mean t'lat was deferring the question of what level of culpability 
A "c.6 t0 ^ s'10wn ^or a transgression of the duty of care, evincing trustee solici-
r k-i-t- * C0laiments [c]ourt[s] are quite likely to protect trustees against heavy 
.abilities, for^interested mistakes in business judgment" from "obstreperous creditors 
aided by hindsight."122 Or something else. 
liability—pW^ C|'rCUlt SPIU HaS 'ndeed emer8ed fying to divine the standard for trustee 
seejnp MnT ° almmg.to draw suPP°rt from Mosser s terse opinion—with some courts 
er as requiring knowing/intentional wrongful conduct to predicate trustee 
341 U.S. 267,274 (1951). 
See M o « e r ^  ̂  ^  
"• Id. at 274. 
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personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty;128 some requiring mere negligence in 
the discharge of duties (Mosser uses the fiduciary-laden term "surcharge");129 and still 
others taking a middle ground of gross negligence (following the ignored recommenda-
tionsofthe 1997 National Bankruptcy Review Commission).130 Someday, albeit perhaps 
a long way off, the Supreme Court will clear this up. 
V. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES WITH 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN INSOLVENCY 
As said, Section 704 is too long to explore in detail, but quick mention can be made of 
less prominent duties sometimes considered fiduciary. Specifically, the Code provides 
an explicit duty to account,131 a duty to collect and preserve assets,132 a duty to keep 
records,133 and a general duty to inform and respond.134 The open-court aspect of bank­
ruptcy lessens the need of fiduciary law to compel free information flow,135 and, indeed, 
this open-court nature renders any "duty to inquire" of the needs of represented liti­
gants inapposite.136 The trustee also may statutorily delegate operation of the estate 
to professionals,137 but must submit a written resignation to the U.S. Trustee to resign 
effectively.138 Case law has generally held that trustees may not delegate the "essential 
decision-making responsibility" of administering a case.139 
Finally, revisiting the DIPs fiduciary duty in the (common) context of a corporate 
debtor is in order before concluding. General corporate law has its own concerns of agency 
challenges and temptations of corporate management exercising their fiduciary duties for 
shareholders.140 Under influential Delaware law, however, this duty to shareholders shifts 
to encompassing creditors as well when the corporation enters the zone of insolvency.141 
Different systems saddle corporate fiduciaries with analogous responsibilities.142 While 
See, e.g., In re Chicago Pac. Corp, 773 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1985). This line of cases has been criticized 
for conflating trustee's personal liability standards (finding the willful/intentional threshold required) 
with the trustee's liability threshold for official liability, which, bizarrely, would be recoverable against 
the estate. See, e.g., McCullough, supra note 28, at 177-179 (citing E. Allan Tiller, Personal Liability of 
Trustees and Receivers in Bankruptcy, 53 Am. Bankr. L.J. 75,100 (1979))-
uo ^Ce' e'^''re C°chise College Park, Inc., 703 E3d 1339,1357 (9th Cir. 1983). 
i3j ^Ce'e'^" 'n re Smyth, 207 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 2000). 131 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(2), (9). 
us W'at (aXU- 133 Id. at (a)(8). '"Id. at (a)(7). 135 Id. at (a)(io). 
137 ^eC'e'^'' h/'arsmar> v- Nasca, 573 N.E.2d 1025,1027 (Mass. App. 1991). 
139 U ^ ^ ^ 327- 138 See Handbook, supra note 33, at § 2.J, 6. 
no fe <"omPuter Learning Ctrs. Inc., 285 B.R. 191, 207 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002). 
See generally Adolph A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
roperty (1932). On the current state of corporate law, see Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Principles in Corporate 
Law, this volume. 
See Hu & Westbrook, supra note 82, at 1338 n.55. This doctrine finds historical pedigree in the trust 
debt ^°Cjj'ne ^a'' Pr'or 1° statutory regulation, policed improper corporate dividends from insolvent 
Id. at 1383 n.226,1400 n.299. 
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this doctrine has undergone some revision (and retrenchment) in recent cases, the 
proposition remains that shareholders lose their exclusive beneficiary status when this 
"zone" has been entered (which now appears to be restricted to just straight "insolvency").11' 
Legions of commentators in the corporate field have attacked and defended this duty-
shifting rule,111 and the bankruptcy community has had its share of insights, too,115 
including Professors Hu and Westbrook. They point out the poor fit of expanding fidu­
ciary obligations to multiple stakeholders at state law, which they contend is ill-equipped 
institutionally to handle policing duties to multiple and antagonistic beneficiaries. Rather, 
say Hu and Westbrook, expanding fiduciary duties to creditors when a corporation 
becomes insolvent (actually or just "zonally") should be abandoned. No duty to creditors 
should obtain unless and until the debtor files a bankruptcy petition."" This proposal is 
grounded in a belief that the bankruptcy system is better suited to handle the endemic 
conflicts of interest between corporate constituencies through the various bankruptcy-
specific mechanisms discussed previously, such as the corporation-funded creditors 
committee, the ability to displace wayward fiduciaries with an external trustee, and, 
most importantly, bankruptcy judge oversight, aided by an automatic stay that freezes 
all creditor conduct and corrals matters into her courtroom.117 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Whatever the generalizability of the Hu/Westbrook proposal beyond Chapter n, it is 
certainly the case that the Bankruptcy Code does indeed have many safeguards designed 
to con ront conflicting creditor incentives, both against the DIP and inter se, in the 
wir ing c aos of insolvency. While bankruptcy courts aren't perfect, they are at least 
Th6 r ° l- ' a"e^'ances anc* Misalignments of interest in their everyday dockets, 
an ruptcy Code allows transparency of the process, committee watchdogs, and 
P ment o t e DIP fiduciary of internal" loyalty with an external trustee all as an 
v c<k>c diiu nominal claims) 1344 leXp "in8 seminal Giahwalla
and the Alternatives, 7 N.Y U°]L l° Cred't0rS m lnsolvency and the Zone of Insolvency: Dela 
derivative standing) "S U010) (canvassing arguments for/against ere 
taxonomy that includes^Grou^ inherent conflict). Kelch proposes a prescri 
through the corporation); and even "StakehnlH °u '|0nstlt,uenc>'); "Diffuse W3'1/' (helP ever> 
fights). Kelch himself suDDorts an aa • , er"Me<llation (remain neutral and transparent a 
ciary duties is impossible. wrsarial Model, contending that DIP discharge of corporate 
JU?C «2^HTRN110  ̂
meaningful discipline at all See H11 ^ lni*ee'' Tues''on whether corporate duties providt 
Westbrook, supra note 82, at 1391 n.260. 
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attempt to manage the challenging fiduciary obligation of "internal" loyalty in the tense 
context of general default. It may even do so more effectively than explicit litigation 
reliance on the fiduciary duties of loyalty and impartiality (with protective doctrines to 
spare the trustee from hindsight). Perhaps scholars of fiduciary duties in high-conflict 
environments could learn from bankruptcy's pragmatic approach. 
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